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Abstract
We model the Spanish wholesale market as a multiplant linear supply function competition
model. According to the theory, the larger generators should have supply curves for each plant
which are to the left of the supply curves of plants owned by smaller generators. We test this
prediction for fuel plants using data from the Spanish Market Operator (OMEL) from May
2001 to December 2003. Our results indicate that the prediction of the model holds.
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11 Introduction
In the context of European deregulation, the Spanish pool for electricity (day-ahead market) started
its operations in January 1998.1 The market is characterized by a high concentration index together
with an inelastic demand. Two companies, Endesa (EN) and Iberdrola (IB), own most of the
generating capacity, while Union Fenosa (UF) and Hidrocantabrico (HC) are smaller competitors;
all are private companies and each owns nuclear, thermal and hydroelectric plants. Since 2002 there
has been entry on a small scale (ENEL, Repsol and Gas Natural, among others).
In this paper we study the observed behavior at the electricity auction of ￿rms with high
market shares and compare it to that of small ￿rms. To interpret any observed di⁄erences in
bidding behavior, we model the outcome of the pool as a supply function equilibrium. The supply
function of a large operator at the pool is obtained by aggregating the supply functions of each
generating plant under its control. If the size of the generator were irrelevant, a generating plant
would bid at the pool independently of whether it belongs to a large operator or to a small ￿rm,
and thus the supply function of a larger operator would coincide with the supply curve obtained
as the sum of the supply functions of similar plants under the control of small ￿rms. However, we
would expect production units to take into account their e⁄ect on other production plants under
the same ownership and respond to their incentive to restrict output and raise prices (i.e. a supply
curve more to the left).
Our purpose is to detect and measure any di⁄erence in bidding behavior between larger and
smaller generators. For the comparison of bid behavior, we choose fuel plants of similar capacities
and ages, and compare their bids for the same auction (same day and same time) so that demand
and cost conditions are the same. Thus, any systematic di⁄erence in their plant supply functions
could be attributed to the generator￿ s size. After observing this di⁄erent behavior in terms of supply
curves at the pool, we measure the impact on equilibrium prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the supply function equilibrium model,
where we show that in equilibrium a plant owned by a larger generator has a supply function
which is to the left of the supply curve of a plant owned by a smaller generator. The rest of the
paper presents the empirical results for the Spanish pool. Our main ￿ndings are that the two larger
operators consistently submit supply curves for fuel plants which are to the left of the corresponding
supply curves of smaller generators. Section 5 concludes.
1See Appendix 1 for a brief description of market rules
22 A supply function equilibrium model
In this section we represent strategic interaction in the electricity market through a supply function
equilibrium model,2 where each generator decides a supply curve for each of the plants it owns. The
supply curve of a generator is then obtained as the sum of the supply curves of all its individual
plants.
We analyze the equilibrium behavior of generators of di⁄erent sizes. In our model the partic-
ipants in the generation market own di⁄erent numbers of production units: a generator with m
plants (generator 1), a generator with k plants (generator 2) and a third generator with only one






where qij denotes electricity produced by plant j owned by generator i. The choice of a linear
marginal cost is frequent because it allows the solution to the system of di⁄erential equations to
be found more easily. Green and Newbery (1992) use quadratic marginal cost, which requires
numerical solution of di⁄erential equations.3 All plants are assumed identical. Demand function is
linear:
Dt = at ￿ bpt + ut (2)
where ut is a random error with zero mean and pt denotes price at period t. Note that the slope of
the demand function b is assumed to be independent of time, while the intercept at may vary over
time. The Spanish electricity auction is a uniform price auction; thus, all buyers (sellers) whose
o⁄er has been accepted pay (receive) the marginal price for the electricity required (supplied) in
their o⁄er. Firms are assumed to be risk neutral and therefore they maximize their expected payo⁄.
Each plant￿ s bid at the auction is represented here as a continuous supply function. The problem
for generator 1, with m plants, is to decide the supply curve for each plant j at each period t, qt
1j(pt),












1j(pt)) for j = 1;:::m
2See Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Green and Newbery (1992), Green (1996), Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2000),
and Bolle (1992). Other authors have analyzed the electricity market as Cournot competition (see Borenstein and
Bushnel, 1997) or as a sealed-bid, multiple-unit, private-value auction (see Wolfram, 1999, von der Fehr and Harbord,
1993, and Garc￿a-D￿az and Mar￿n, 2003). For a further discussion of the advantages of the supply function equilibrium
model over Cournot, see Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2000).
3See also Laussel (1992).
3Since all plants are identical, qt
i(pt) denotes the supply curve of any plant belonging to generator
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We look for solutions of the form:4
qt
i(pt) = Ai + Bipt i = 1;2;3
and obtain:
A1 = A2 = A3 = 0
B1 =
b + kB2 + B3
m + cm[b + kB2 + B3 + (m ￿ 1)B1]
B2 =
b + mB1 + B3
k + ck[b + mB1 + B3 + (k ￿ 1)B2]
(3)
B3 =
b + mB1 + kB2
1 + c[b + mB1 + kB2]
4When the support of the demand uncertainty is unbounded the linear equilibrium is unique, but in general there
will be multiple equilibria. See Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Laussel (1992).
4Solving the system we get the equilibrium values B1 (b;c;m;k), B2 (b;c;m;k), B3 (b;c;m;k), as
functions of the parameters of the model, and thus the equilibrium supply curve for each plant.5
Since we are assuming that b and c are constant over time, the slope of the supply function is also
constant over time. The main result of this section, which will be tested later on, is the following:
Proposition 1 Large generators submit plant supply curves which are to the left of the plant
supply curves of small generators:
B1 (b;c;m;k) ￿ B2 (b;c;m;k) < B3 (b;c;m;k)
The result can be checked from the expressions for B1, B2 and B3 in (3). A generator with a
large number of plants has to take into account the e⁄ect of a plant￿ s bid on the price received by
its other plants. Therefore, to maximize total pro￿ts, each plant restricts output, i.e., it o⁄ers a
lower amount at each price, or asks for a higher price for each energy volume. Since all production
units have the same technology, the di⁄erent positions of the supply curves are due only to the size
of the generators. Increasing output (moving the supply curve to the right) has a negative e⁄ect on
all the other plants￿pro￿ts. A larger generator would internalize these e⁄ects and therefore choose
for each plant a supply curve with a higher slope (lower B).
The aggregate supply function is:
St = Bpt + "t (4)
where B = (mB1 + kB2 + B3) and "t is an error term with zero mean.
Matching aggregate demand and aggregate supply (equations 2 and 4) we obtain the equilibrium
price and energy traded pt = at
B+b + ut￿"t
B+b and qt = Bat
B+b + But+b"t
B+b . Note that qt and pt are
higher in high demand periods (high at) and are a⁄ected by demand and supply errors (ut and "t,
respectively).
2.1 Impact of di⁄erences in supply curves on prices
From Proposition 1 we would expect a larger generator to instruct its plants to restrict output,
submitting supply curves to the left. The di⁄erence in supply curves will be measured by its impact
on market clearing prices. For that purpose, we use as a benchmark a multiplant generator which
behaves as the sum of independent ￿rms.
De￿nition 1 A Synthetic Firm is a multiplant ￿rm where each production unit maximizes its
pro￿ts.
5When the cost function in (1) includes a linear term diqi, the supply function has a non-zero intercept.
5Note that in a synthetic ￿rm total pro￿ts are not maximized, since the e⁄ect of each plant￿ s
supply curve on other plants under the same ownership is not taken into account.
In our analysis of the pool equilibrium, we replace generator 1￿ s behavior by synthetic generator
1￿ s: Each plant in synthetic generator 1 maximizes pro￿ts individually and as a result this synthetic
supply function equilibrium is given by;
Bs
1 =
b + kB2 + B3 + (m ￿ 1)Bs
1





k + ck[b + mBs





1 + c[b + mB1 + kB2]
where superscript s denotes that the ￿rm is synthetic. Solving this system we obtain Bs
1 = B3 > B2.
The equality between Bs
1 and B3 is not surprising: synthetic generator 1￿ s plants are maximizing
individual pro￿ts hence they behave exactly as the single-plant generator 3 does. It is worth noting
that the equilibrium values for B3 and B2 are di⁄erent from before, since generators 2 and 3 react
to the behavior of generator 1.
Denote by pB(at) the expected equilibrium price at the pool when ￿rms submit supply curves
given by system (3) and by pB1s(at) the expected equilibrium price with supply curves given by
system (5), i.e. when the slope of the aggregate supply function is B1
s
= (mBs
1 + kB2 + B3). The
impact of generator 1 on prices is pB(at) ￿ pB1s(at).










Similarly, the impact on prices of generator 2 is pB(at)￿pB2s(at), with B2
s
= (mB1 + kBs
2 + B3):
The impact of ￿rm 3 is zero by de￿nition since Bs
3 = B3. When the number of plants tends to
in￿nity then Bs
1 tends to 1
c, that is, each ￿rm submits its marginal cost function at the pool (see
Appendix 2).
63 Empirical implementation
In this section we test for di⁄erences in the supply curves submitted by ￿rms of di⁄erent sizes. In the
model described in section 2 we assume that all plants have the same technology. To approximate
these conditions as closely as possible in our empirical implementation we will consider only one
class of plants: fuel thermal plants.6 The reference point is the bidding behavior in the pool of small
generators. Larger generators are likely to present bids for each plant that maximize overall pro￿ts
for the ￿rm. At the same auction, there are small generators with plants of similar characteristics.
We approximate the competitive behavior for a larger generator using the bids at the same auction
of small generators. The two largest generators in the Spanish wholesale market are Endesa (EN)
and Iberdrola (IB). We build a ￿ Synthetic Endesa￿(ENs) and a ￿ Synthetic Iberdrola￿(IBs).
Then we compare the prices obtained before and after replacing the supply functions of the ￿rms
by the supply curves of the synthetic ￿rms.
Figures 1 and 2 present such a comparison for EN and IB, respectively, for the year 2003. On
the horizontal axis we represent monthly quantities traded in the market. Observations are sorted
from smallest to biggest. On the vertical axis we represent the monthly weighted average synthetic
prices and observed prices. Note that the observed average price is consistently higher than the
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Synthetic EN  prices vs Observed Prices
6Nuclear production is unlikely to be used strategically and hydro units are less homogeneous than oil-￿red plants.
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Synthetic IB prices vs Observed Prices
Figure 2
In the previous section we obtained the observed price for the linear model as a function of
demand and supply parameters as well as demand and supply random errors: pt = pB(at)+ ut￿"t
B+b .
These prices are obtained empirically by simply crossing demand Dt and supply St. Then we use
UF, HC￿ s and other small generators￿oil-￿red production plants to build the synthetic Endesa
(ENs) and the synthetic Iberdrola (IBs). For each oil-￿red plant owned by a large generator,
plant L, we ￿nd a plant with a similar capacity owned by a small generator, plant S. We compute
a capacity coe¢ cient dividing the capacity of plant L by the capacity of plant S: KL
KS . We multiply
the quantities in the bid by ￿rm S by the coe¢ cient KL
KS , so as to get a ￿ scaled bid￿ . Plant L￿ s bid
is then replaced by the ￿ scaled bid￿by plant S. The bid so obtained is called the synthetic bid for
plant L.
Repeating this procedure for all the oil-￿red plants owned by a large generator we get its
synthetic fuel supply curve. Here we describe the test for the largest generator EN. The same
procedure is then applied to the second generator IB.
We obtain the equilibrium price when EN￿ s supply is replaced by its synthetic supply: pEN
s
t .
In the linear model these synthetic prices are:
pEN
s
t = pBENs(at) +
ut ￿ ￿t
BENs + b
8where ￿t are random error terms with zero mean. If the bidding behavior of EN and the small
generators were the same, then BEN
s
= B and therefore the time series pEN
s
t and pt would only
di⁄er in the realization of random errors with zero mean.
Under the alternative hypothesis, large generators restrict output, as shown in Proposition 1,
so that BEN
s
< B, which implies that we should expect positive values for the di⁄erences:
pt ￿ pEN
s









Our empirical test is based on that implication of the model, although it does not depend on the
speci￿c functional form of demand and supply schedules. Under the null hypothesis pt and pEN
s
t
will only di⁄er in the realization of a random error, while under the alternative, pt, pEN
s
t will show
a systematic di⁄erence which is a function of the demand level at; in particular, pt > pEN
s
t , as the
theory predicts that larger generators submit supply curves more to the left.
We test for di⁄erences in the means of the two series of prices. We use the t-test to determine
whether the two datasets di⁄er signi￿cantly. Because the test is performed under very general
conditions, it is interesting to control for the size of the demand. Therefore we also perform a test






or, in other words, we
test whether the functions pB(at) and pBENs(at) are identical or not (see Appendix 4).7
4 Data and results
The data consist of hourly demand and supply bids for each agent and for each generation plant and
demand agent in the day-ahead wholesale electricity market from May 2001 to December 2003.8
There are a total of 23400 hours, 5880 between May 2001 and December 2001, and 8760 hours in
2002 and 2003.
The installed capacity of oil-￿red plants is 8262 MW. Five companies own the plants, EN
(32:2%), IB (38:6%), UF (9:3%), HC (10:7%) and VI (9:1%). Considering all capacity total mar-
ket shares are: EN 35:06%, IB 35:49%, UF 12:21%, HC 4:75% and VI 4:3%. As a competitive
benchmark we use the bidding behavior of oil-￿red plants under the ownership of the two smallest
companies which own some fuel capacity, that is HC and VI. Note that the two larger ￿rms also have
most of the fuel capacity generation, and that the three smaller ￿rms have similar fuel capacities
(although UF￿ s overall market share is higher). To make bid comparisons we use plants of similar
capacity and age bidding at the same hourly auction. We exclude plants with shared ownership
(in fact there is only one such plant). Appendix 5 presents the list of plants and synthetic plants
(Table 4) and a detailed description of how they were chosen.
7See Hall and Hart (1990) and Ferreira and Stute (2003).
8We do not consider the energy traded in the intra-day market, which amounts to less than 5% of the energy
traded in the day-ahead market.
9With these data, we compute the following prices: the market clearing prices, {pt}, and the





t } and {pUF
S
t }.
The supply bids at the auction sometimes include restrictions that may be binding.9 When that
is the case, those bids are not included in the ￿nal assignment by the market operator, OMEL.
Since these restrictions cannot be replicated for the synthetic bids we decided to ignore them. This
sometimes causes our market clearing prices to be lower than the price made public by the market
operator. Since the complex conditions on the supply bids are ignored for both the real and the
synthetic plants, there is no reason to think that this procedure is introducing any bias.
On the other hand, the market operator sometimes rejects demand bids at a high price because
they are unfeasible given the capacity restrictions of the interconnections with neighboring countries.
In such cases there is a rationing procedure to assign the interconnection capacity between bidders.
This reduction on demand sometimes causes our market clearing price to be higher than the price
published by OMEL. Again, these capacity limits are ignored for both the synthetic ￿rms and the
actual ones so no bias is introduced.
Table 1 summarizes the results for the null hypothesis of equal bidding behavior between larger
and small generators for each of the large ￿rms.
Table 1: Di⁄erences in oil-￿red bid behavior for EN, IB and UF
Test of means Test of Ferreira-Stute















































Prices are measured in ce/kWh. Standard errors into brackets.
*** Signi￿cant at 1% level
The statistical results allow us to reject the hypothesis that large and small generators have the
same oil-￿red bidding behavior. In fact, we can conclude that plants owned by large generators have
9A ￿ complex o⁄er￿ may include indivisibility conditions (for the ￿rst block in the bid), a minimum revenue
condition, load gradient conditions and scheduled stop conditions.
10restricted output by bidding plant supply curves to the left of those owned by small generators. In
other words, higher market concentration is associated with higher prices. This empirical result is
also consistent with other theoretical models. In Appendix 3 we show that a linear Cournot model
would have the same implication.
We also consider possible di⁄erences in bidding behavior between small generators. UF could be
included among the small generators since its market share (12.21%) and its impact on equilibrium
prices is lower, as can be seen in Table 1.We build the synthetic supply curves for the three ￿rms.
Thus "Synthetic HC" (HCS) is built using plants from either UF or VI, "Synthetic UF" (UFS) is
built using plants from either HC or VI, and "Synthetic VI" (V IS) is built with plants from UF
and HC. Results are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Di⁄erences in oil-￿red bid behavior for UF, HC and VI
Test of Mean Di⁄erences for Small Firms
Test of Means Test of Ferreira-Stute












































8:12￿￿￿ ￿5:12￿￿￿ ￿4:115 ￿ ￿￿
Prices are measured in ce/MWh. Standard errors in brackets.
*** Signi￿cant at 1% level
As Table 2 indicates HC￿ s bids are lower on average than UF￿ s, as the theory predicts since UF￿ s
overall market share is 12:21% as compared to the 4:75% of HC. The smallest ￿rm, VI, presents
the lowest average bids. With this procedure we measure bid behavior di⁄erences between ￿rms, so
that when the competitive benchmark changes, the measured impact on equilibrium prices of larger
generators also changes. To see the e⁄ect of including UF￿ s plants in the competitive benchmark,
we present in Table 3 the impact of IB and EN on equilibrium prices when the reference point is
the behavior of UF, HC and VI oil-￿red plants.
11Table 3: Di⁄erences in oil-￿red bid behavior for EN and IB
Test of means Test of Ferreira-Stute


































Prices are measured in ce/kWh. Standard errors in
brackets.
*** Signi￿cant at 1% level
** Signi￿cant at 5% level
The results in Table 3 reveal the same qualitative results: The two largest generators, EN and
IB, present bids for oil-￿red plants that are consistently higher than the bids for similar plants
owned by UF, HC and VI. The quantitative results, however, are sensitive to whether or not UF￿ s
plants are considered in building the synthetic ￿rms. Comparing Table 2 and Table 3 we observe
that our measure of EN￿ s impact on prices is lower than IB￿ s on Table 3, while the opposite is true
in Table 1. This is due to the fact that UF￿ s plants are closer in capacity and age to EN￿ s plants so
that they are used more often to generate ENS; in the case of IB, the other two small ￿rms have
more similar plants so that UF is used less often to generate IBS. This has introduced a bias in the
results presented in Table 3: The impact of EN on equilibrium prices is underestimated because
the competitive benchmark used contains a ￿rm with non-negligible market power. In this respect,
it is worth noting that for the procedure to provide a good measure of the impact on prices, it
would be necessary, on the one hand, for the ￿rms in entering the competitive benchmark to have
a low market share and, on the other hand, for the ￿rms in the benchmark to own plants of similar
technical characteristics.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have modeled the outcome of the pool as a supply function equilibrium and tested
whether the bidding behavior of large generators di⁄ers from that of small generators. For that
12purpose we have designed a procedure for comparing the bidding behavior of di⁄erent generators.
The procedure is based on the de￿nition of a synthetic ￿rm. To construct the synthetic ￿rm for each
large generator, we delimit a set of ￿rms with the following conditions: They are small generators,
so that their market power can be considered negligible, and they own plants technically similar to
those of large generators (capacity and age). The bidding behavior of this set of ￿rms is then set as
a competitive benchmark. We use this procedure to compare the supply bids of oil-￿red plants in
the Spanish pool. Our empirical results indicate that the total size of the generator a⁄ects the bid
of a oil-￿red plant: Larger generators restrict output and drive prices up, as the theory predicts.
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15Appendix 1. The pool
The day-ahead market for electricity works as follows. Before 11:00 a.m., quali￿ed buyers and
sellers of electricity present their o⁄ers for the following day. Each day is divided into 24 hourly
periods.
Sellers in the pool present bids consisting of up to 25 di⁄erent prices and the corresponding
energy quantities for each of the 24 periods and for each generating unit they own; the prices must
be increasing.10 If no restriction is included in the o⁄er this is called a ￿ simple o⁄er￿ . A seller
may also present a ￿ complex o⁄er￿which may include indivisibility conditions, a minimum revenue
condition, production capacity variation (load gradient conditions) and scheduled stop conditions.
The pool administrator consolidates the sales bids for each hourly period to generate an aggregate
supply curve.
Quali￿ed buyers in the pool present o⁄ers.11 Purchase bids state a quantity and a price of
a power block and there can be as many as 25 power purchasing blocks for the same purchasing
unit, with di⁄erent prices for each block; the prices must be decreasing. The pool administrator
constructs an aggregate demand with these o⁄ers.
In a session of the daily market the pool administrator combines these o⁄ers matching demand
and supply for each of the 24 hourly periods and determines the equilibrium price for each period
(the system marginal price) and the amount traded. This matching is called the base daily operating
schedule (PBF). After the base daily operating schedule is settled, the pool administrator evaluates
the technical feasibility of the assignment; if the required technical restrictions are met then the
program is feasible; if not, some previously accepted o⁄ers are eliminated and others included to
obtain the provisional feasible daily schedule (PVP). The ￿nal feasible daily schedule (PVD) is
obtained taking into account the ancillary services assignment procedure.
10According to the Electricity Market Activity Rules, p. 6, generators ￿shall be required to submit electric power
sale bids to the market operator for each of the production units they own for each and every one of the hourly
scheduling periods.￿There is an exception to this rule when the production unit has a bilateral contract which, due
to its characteristics, is excluded from the bidding system.
11From January 1st 2003, all buyers of electricity are considered quali￿ed buyers. Before that date quali￿ed buyers
were those with consumption greater than or equal to 1 GWh per year. The required consumption has decreased
over time from 5GWh (December 1998) to 3GWh (April 1999), to 2GWh (July 1999) and to 1 GWh (October 1999).
16Appendix 2. Competitive limit
We show that when the number of plants tends to in￿nity and all generators are synthetic ￿rms,
the linear solution of the supply curve equilibrium tends to the competitive solution, i. e. each ￿rm
bids its marginal cost function.
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Thus, at the limit the supply curve for each plant is p = cq, which coincides with the marginal
cost curve C0(q) = cq:
17Appendix 3. Cournot competition
A linear Cournot competition model would also predict a di⁄erent behavior for large and small
generators. From pro￿t maximization for each ￿rm we obtain the following reaction functions:
q1 =
a￿kq2￿q3
2m+bc ; q2 =
a￿mq1￿q3



















b2c2 + kbc + bcm + km
￿
Z
where Z = b3c3 + 2b2c2 (1 + k + m) + 3bc(k + m + km) + 4km. From these expressions it can
be seen that the output for each plant is such that:
q1 ￿ q2 < q3
18Appendix 4. Test of conditional means. Ferreira-Stute (2003)

























B(u) = ￿ sup
0￿u￿1
B(u)
where B is a Brownian motion. Furthermore, we have that
P[ sup
0￿u￿1
B(u) ￿ ￿] = 2￿(￿) ￿ 1
where ￿(￿) is the distribution function of the normal distribution. Thus,
P[T ￿ ￿] ! 2￿(￿) ￿ 1
We compute the T statistic for several tests, and present the results in Tables 1, 2 and 3. In
our model at is a measure of intensity of demand at each hour t. As an index for demand level we
choose for each t the energy demanded at prices 18ce/KWh or above (the horizontal segment of
the aggregate demand schedule).
19Appendix 5. Fuel plants
We summarize some characteristics of the plants under study. Column 1 is the name of the
plant (code in brackets), column 2 is the starting date of operation, column 3 is the power of each
generating unit and column 4 is the owner. Column 5 represents the synthetic plant used under
the selection procedure.
There has been no entry of new oil-￿red plants during the period under study. Only ALG has
changed ownership; until January 2002 it belonged to EN, since then it has belonged to VI. The
total number of oil-￿red units bidding in the day-ahead market is 29. We have excluded ACE1 and
ACE2 from Table 4 because they are the only plants with shared ownership (IB 50% and UF 50%),
and are neither used to build a synthetic plant nor synthesized.
For the construction of a synthetic ￿rm for a large generator, plants are selected taking into
account capacity and age. When for whatever reason there is no bid by the selected plant (main-
tenance, breakdown, etc) then the second best match is chosen (in brackets in the last column).
20Table 4. The oil-￿red plants
Plant Code Age Power (MW) Ownership Synthetic Plant (Alternate)
ABO1 1974 351 HC SBO2 (SBO1; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
ABO2 1985 536 HC SBO2 (SBO1; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
ADR1 1973 335 EN ABO1 (SBO2)
ADR2 1973 335 EN ABO1 (SBO2)









BDL1 1967 172 EN SBO1 (SBO2; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
BDL2 1967 172 EN SBO1 (SBO2; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
BES1 1967 145 EN SBO1 (SBO2; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
BES2 1972 294 EN SBO2 (ABO1)
COL1 1961 70 EN SBO1 (SBO2; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
COL2 1964 144 EN SBO1 (SBO2; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
COL3 1968 155 EN SBO1 (SBO2; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
CTN1 1972 542 IB ABO2 (ABO2; 2001) (ALG2; 2002, 2003)
CTN2 1973 542 IB ABO2 (ABO2; 2001) (ALG2; 2002, 2003)
ESC1 1956 70 IB SBO1 (SBO2; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
ESC2 1957 70 IB SBO1 (SBO2; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
ESC3 1957 140 IB SBO1 (SBO2; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
ESC4 1966 289 IB SBO2 (ABO1)
ESC5 1968 289 IB SBO2 (ABO1)
FOI1 1980 502 EN ABO2 (ABO1; 2001) (ALG2; 2002, 2003)
SBO1 1972 115 UF ABO2 (ABO1; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
SBO2 1975 341 UF ABO1 (ABO2)
STC1 1969 378 IB ABO1 (SBO2)
STC2 1972 542 IB ABO2 (ABO1; 2001) (ALG2; 2002, 2003)
STC3 1972 17 IB ABO1 (SBO2; 2001) (ALG1; 2002, 2003)
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